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The Retail Revolution and
Food-Price Mismeasurement
Leonard I. Nakamura*
In December 1995, the U.S. Senate Finance
Committee’s Commission to Review the Con-
sumer Price Index issued its final report. This
report stated that the U.S. Consumer Price In-
dex (CPI) was an upwardly biased measure of
the cost of living that most likely exaggerated
inflation by 1.1 percentage points a year. Exag-
gerating inflation means that we underestimate
the purchasing power of our money and thus
reduce gains in output when we measure them
in inflation-adjusted dollars. The report at-
tempted primarily to estimate the current and
future bias of the CPI; it did not discuss the his-
torical bias nor whether the bias had increased.
This article presents evidence that the upward
bias in measures of U.S. inflation worsened in
the late 1970s. A rising bias would support the
argument that the slowdown in growth of U.S.
inflation-adjusted output and labor productiv-
ity reported since the mid-1970s is an artifact
of mismeasurement.1
*Leonard Nakamura is a research adviser in the Re-
search Department of the Philadelphia Fed.
1Labor productivity is the average amount of inflation-
adjusted output produced by an hour of work. For further
discussion of productivity measures and the productivity
slowdown, see “Is the U.S. Economy Really Growing Too
Slowly? Maybe We’re Measuring Growth Wrong,”  Busi-
ness Review, March/April 1997.4 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW MAY/JUNE 1998
Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow has
said of this slowdown, “We see computers ev-
erywhere but in the statistics.” This so-called
Solow paradox draws its power from the ob-
servation that not only is there no apparent
pickup in productivity growth from the wide-
spread adoption of personal computers that
began in the late 1970s, but, instead, our offi-
cial statistics report a drastic slowdown. I ar-
gue here that one of the impacts of the new elec-
tronic technology has been a retail revolution
that has made price measurement more diffi-
cult. Our failure to see faster growth from com-
puterization is thus a side effect of the confron-
tation between an outmoded statistical system
and a rapidly changing economy.
In particular, the implementation of new
technologies—scanners, universal product
codes, and electronic cash registers—that be-
gan in the late 1970s has enhanced the ability
of producers and retailers to charge a variety
of different prices for identical or similar prod-
ucts.2  Deregulation of the U.S. economy has
removed restrictions on competition, also en-
hancing the ability of sellers to change prices
and increase their product offerings. One such
act was the repeal of so-called fair trade laws—
these laws, despite their name, tended to pre-
vent retail discounting.3 As these changes took
hold, the methodology underlying the U.S.
Consumer Price Index (CPI) was revised sub-
stantially. The methodological change was in-
tended to reduce the upward bias in inflation
measurement, but, in practice, it exaggerated
the bias as price dispersion accelerated.
Food prices provide an illuminating case
study of the measurement problems created by
price dispersion.4 Food is historically the most
basic product in any economy, and its inflation
rate has long been documented. The American
economic historian’s bible, Historical Statistics
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, records
wholesale and retail food prices going back to
the 18th century. When the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) first
began collecting monthly data on retail prices
after World War I, it began with a set of 30 food
articles and investigated monthly price changes
going back to 1890. While much of the discus-
sion of the mismeasurement of inflation has
centered on the introduction of new goods (see
my article, “Measuring Inflation in a High-Tech
Age”), two recent studies, by Marshall
Reinsdorf (1993) of the BLS and by James
MacDonald (1995) of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, suggest that, since the late 1970s,
the Consumer Price Index has substantially
overestimated inflation in food. (See It Isn’t Just
An Eating Disorder.)
THE RETAIL REVOLUTION
Retailing in the United States has been revo-
lutionized over the past two decades. The use
of scanners, for example, began slowly but
picked up rapidly in the 1980s (Table 1).  Scan-
ners read the bar codes on products for the cash
registers, which translate the codes into prod-
uct descriptions and prices and then tally them
2Levy et al. (1997) examined a sample of four large su-
permarket chains with the modern technology and showed
that the cost of changing prices was 52 cents per product
price change. At a chain located in a state in which retailers
are required to place a price on each individual item, the
cost averages $1.33 per product price change. They went
on to show that the four chains whose cost is lower change
prices far more frequently.
3Two laws, the 1937 Miller-Tydings Resale Price Main-
tenance Act and the 1952 McGuire Act, made it possible for
a small retailer to sign an agreement with a manufacturer
that would then prevent all retailers in that state from of-
fering discounts on the manufacturer’s products. Since 1976
such so-called fair trade agreements have been illegal.
4This article is based primarily on Nakamura (1998),
which discusses empirical evidence on retail food prices
and the underlying economic theory of price measurement
when price dispersion occurs.Restructuring During Recessions: A Silver Lining in the Cloud? Keith Sill
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It Isn't Just An Eating Disorder
The biases for food discussed in the article are also found in the CPI for airfares, college tuition,
gasoline prices, hotel rates, and prices for department store merchandise. Airfares are a particularly
good example of the joint impact of deregulation and computerization. In 1978, there was only one
round-trip coach fare on most routes, as fares were regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board. At
present, by contrast, dozens of different fares are available with a variety of restrictions on every
route, and the fare structure changes by the minute.
Between 1978 and 1996, the average price paid per mile by passengers grew at an annual rate of 2.7
percent (Table). The CPI-U for airfares grew at an annual rate of 8.3 percent, a difference of 5.6 per-
centage points. If we use the CPI for airfares to deflate airline revenues from passenger travel, we find
that “real” airline passenger travel fell from 1978 to 1996. But, in fact, passenger miles on airlines more
than doubled.
How can such a substantial gap have been sustained for so long? The reason is the dispersion of
fares. Full fares for unrestricted travel have risen at an average annual rate of 9 percent, and the CPI
for airfares has basically tracked the full fare.The average restricted (discount) fare has increased only
2 percent a year. The average domestic unrestricted fare is now about three times the average re-
stricted fare. But only 7 percent of passenger miles are flown at full fare. By contrast, in 1978, virtually
all travel on scheduled airlines was at full fare.
College tuition shows a bias because colleges offer reductions in tuition to a large proportion of
students—this is, of course, straightforward price discrimination on the basis of ability to pay. Tuition
data collected by the National Association of College and University Business Officers show that, not
counting scholarship discounts, private school tuition for their members rose 6.6 percent annually
from the school year 1990-91 to 1995-96, but only 4.3 percent annually over the same period if you
include the discounts.
Airfares




1982-84=100 23.7 45.5 192.5 4.8% 8.3%
yield, cents per full fare 38.9¢ 8.8%
passenger-mile
average 6.1¢ 8.5¢ 13.7¢ 2.4% 2.7%
restricted 12.0¢ 2.0%
Sources: BLS and Air Transport Association
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for the customer and the store. If the store is
part of a chain, the scanners permit the store’s
daily sales to be cumulated for relay to the
chain’s centralized computer, the electronic data
warehouse. The electronic data warehouse sup-
plies detailed, item-by-item data on sales and
store inventory to managers, buyers, and sup-
pliers. These tools have made it possible for
retailers to change prices rapidly; prices that
previously were printed on items or stamped
on by hand could instead be attached to the
shelf.  This system eliminated much of the work
of stock clerks and substantially reduced the
cost of changing prices. Changing prices of
products on a weekly basis became a core prac-
tice in grocery stores. Equally important, stores
became more adept at tracking inventory and
measuring the profitability of individual prod-
ucts. Retailers’ increased use of technology, in
turn, gave added momentum to a move toward
larger stores offering greater quality, variety,
and convenience.
Conventional supermarkets accounted for 73
percent of supermarket sales in 1980. But they
lost their market dominance and, by 1994, ac-
counted for only 28 percent of sales.5 They were
replaced by two types of establishments:
superstores (supermarkets that include baker-
ies, butchers, delicatessens, pharmacies, and
other formerly separate units), whose share of
sales rose from 22 percent in 1980 to a domi-
nant 57 percent in 1994; and warehouses (large
discount supermarkets), whose share rose from
5 percent to 15 percent over the same period.
The total floor space of grocery stores rose
nearly 40 percent between 1977 and 1992, and
hours of operation increased: the average chain
supermarket was open 131 hours a week in
1994—nearly 19 hours a day! The average num-
ber of different items stocked, which had in-
creased 20 percent from 1970 to 1980, rose 75
percent from 1980 to 1990. New product intro-
ductions also accelerated dramatically (Table
2).6 And while retailers were able to reduce the
number of clerks stocking shelves, they in-
TABLE 1
Supermarket Scanner Usage




1982 1983 1990 1994
Chain Stores 26% 38% 80% 95%
Independent 18% 22% 61% 80%
Source: Progressive Grocer, various issues.
TABLE 2




1970 1980 1990 1994
Items per Store 7,800 9,400 16,500 19,612
New Products 1,365 2,689 13,244 20,076
Source: Progressive Grocer and New Product News,
various issues.
5Conventional supermarkets are large self-service stores
that offer a complete line of grocery items but lack the full-
service departments found in superstores, yet they provide
more variety and service than discount warehouses.
6These new product introductions are predominantly
brand extensions, such as new soup or cereal varieties.Restructuring During Recessions: A Silver Lining in the Cloud? Keith Sill
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creased the number of checkout clerks and cash
registers. In short, supermarkets offered dra-
matically more services to their customers—
more space, more variety, longer hours, and
faster checkouts.
These larger stores typically set up shop in
suburban areas, where relatively low land
prices made opening new stores less costly and
competition stiffer. Much of this competition
did not take the straightforward form of uni-
formly lower prices. Instead, supermarkets in-
creasingly offered weekly specials, with fliers
going out to neighborhood shoppers.  Manu-
facturers increased their issuance of cents-off
coupons, and supermarkets sweetened these
coupons by doubling them. And while manu-
facturers promoted brand-name products with
national ad campaigns, supermarkets increas-
ingly offered in-house brands at discount prices.
On its surface, this price dispersion seems
irrational or tyrannical. After all, it forces us to
spend more time shopping—looking for cou-
pons, mailing in rebate coupons, searching the
shelves to compare prices, and going from store
to store to “cherry pick” the bargains.
If price dispersion were merely a cost im-
posed on customers, it would not be a success-
ful retail strategy. Customers would shun su-
permarkets that adopted the new technology
and embrace stores that stayed with the old.
But the reverse has happened.
Chain stores adopted the new technology
more rapidly than independent stores did, and
at the same time, the shift away from indepen-
dent ownership of supermarkets to chain own-
ership accelerated. The sales share of indepen-
dents declined 4 percentage points, from 42
percent to 38 percent, in the 20 years from 1954
to 1974. In the 20-year period in which scan-
ners were adopted, 1974 to 1994, the sales share
of independents slid 12 more percentage
points—three times as much.
So why is price dispersion such a prevalent
phenomenon?  How does it benefit consumers
and the retailers that adopt it?
The Efficiency of Price Dispersion. The in-
crease in living standards that made many
Americans dissatisfied with bright yellow mus-
tard, canned peas, and gelatin desserts has led
to a desire for a vast variety of food products.
Different shoppers want different characteris-
tics from their stores, and in particular, some
customers value low prices more while other
customers place greater importance on variety
and quality.7 Price dispersion then becomes a
strategy the retailer can employ to satisfy a di-
verse clientele.
Mr. Retiree will drive 15 extra miles to stock
up on tuna fish or toilet paper if the price is
right. Ms. Superwoman is always having to
change her schedule at the last minute and
wants to put a gourmet meal on the table with
nearly no shopping or cooking time. Price isn’t
the issue; time is. Mr. Xgen wants food with
style but has no money to spare. Ms. Maven
tries out new foods and passes the news on to
her relatives and neighbors. By shrewdly jug-
gling prices, the store manager can deliver low
prices on basics to Mr. Retiree, a broad selec-
tion of fresh and frozen dishes with a high
markup to Ms. Superwoman, hip new foods at
low prices to Mr. Xgen, and a wide variety of
new foods to Ms. Maven at relatively high
prices.
Mr. Retiree would shop at the store with the
lowest prices regardless of variety or service.
So the superstore makes sure that at least once
every two months each basic item on Mr.
Retiree’s shopping list goes on sale for a week,
at the lowest price in the area. And the extra
checkout clerks the store provides to shorten
7This section argues that price dispersion, under the
pressure of competition, is efficient.  The argument is that
grocery store owners—as far as possible—use Ramsey pric-
ing to get consumers with different price elasticities to pay
different shares of the fixed costs associated with variety
and convenience. A nice theoretical discussion of this is Bliss
(1988); empirical support is provided by Betancourt and
Malanoski (1995).
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Ms. Superwoman’s waiting time at the cash
register gives Mr. Retiree a reason to prefer the
superstore when prices are equal. Mr. Xgen
trolls the gourmet aisles for discounts; he helps
the store manager keep inventories of fancy
foods—especially perishables—under control.
This is particularly important because new and
fancy foods are subject to fads—often led by
Ms. Maven and joined by Ms. Superwoman.
Of course, Ms. Maven and Ms. Superwoman
would prefer to pay lower prices, but they aren’t
willing to wait for discounts. Nevertheless, they
often do benefit from discounts—but less than
more patient shoppers do. Mr. Retiree and Mr.
Xgen would prefer not to have to spend so
much time shopping, but they demand low
prices. And they are beneficiaries of the more
cordial service and large variety that the
wealthier customers demand.
Price dispersion enables store managers to
satisfy all these types of customers—to the ex-
tent possible. And electronics makes price dis-
persion feasible by lowering the cost of chang-
ing prices and providing an abundance of in-
formation on the success of different pricing
strategies. When markets are highly competi-
tive, stores succeed by satisfying their custom-
ers.
The Customer Is Always Right, but the
Price Inspectors May Be Wrong. Unfortunately,
our official price-measurement system is not
well adapted to a world in which prices change
frequently. Suppose the typical store that sold
Diet Pop for $3 a 12-pack last year now sells it
for $2 for three days a month and $4 for 27 days
a month. Has the price fallen to $2 or gone up
to $4? The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ price in-
spectors will find the price $2 one-tenth of the
time and $4 nine-tenths of the time, for an av-
erage price of $3.80.  But the store is likely to
sell much more per day at the $2 price than at
the $4 price, as shoppers learn to stock up at
the lower price. If the store sells the same total
number of 12-packs at the lower price in three
days as it does at the higher price in 27 days,
the average price, weighted by sales, is $3.00—
the price consumers pay, on average, hasn’t
changed.
How would this price dispersion affect our
measures of output and productivity?  Suppose
1 billion 12-packs of Diet Pop are made and sold
each year. The first year it took 10,000 workers
to produce and sell that much soda, and the
second year it took 9000 workers, so that pro-
ductivity rose 11 percent (from 100,000 12-packs
per worker to 111,000). In both years, $3 billion
is spent on Diet Pop. But the price inspectors,
on average, report a price increase from $3 to
$3.80 a 12-pack. Using this price information, it
appears as if the second year’s $3 billion ex-
penditure on Diet Pop represents only 790 mil-
lion 12-packs ($3 billion divided by $3.80 per
12-pack) even though consumers are buying as
much as ever.8 In this case, measured produc-
tivity will show a fall of about 11 percent, that
is, a decrease from 100,000 12-packs per worker
to 89,000 (= 790 million divided by 9000 work-
ers), instead of a rise of 11 percent.
To tell whether our official measures have
been significantly affected in this way, we need
to check what alternative methods tell us about
prices being paid. One possibility is supermar-
ket tape data. These data show how much the
stores surveyed sold of each product and the
prices at which each was sold. Another possi-
bility is to compare wholesale prices, the prices
supermarkets pay. These prices may be less
subject to the price dispersion that occurs at the
retail level.
8Broadly speaking, within the U.S. federal statistical
system, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, part of the Depart-
ment of Labor, collects price data while nominal expendi-
ture data are collected by the Department of Commerce.
The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis is responsible for constructing measures of real output
for the national income accounts, for the most part deflat-
ing the nominal expenditure data by the Bureau of Labor




Recent studies by two U.S. government
economists suggest that food-price inflation in
the U.S. CPI has been overstated between 1.5
and 2 percentage points a year.
Marshall Reinsdorf’s 1993 study compared
the CPI for food with an alternative food-price
measure, the series on average food prices, also
compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9
This average price (AP) series does not differ-
entiate as the CPI does between generics and
brand names and between types of stores. In
particular, if consumers switch from full-price
stores to discount outlets, or from name brands
to house brands or generic products, this switch
will show up in the AP as a decline in average
price but will not affect the comparable CPI
series.
The AP series is what economists have col-
lected historically and, except for a break from
1978 to 1980, is available going back to 1890 for
nine foods. Before 1978, the CPI series and the
AP series showed no systematic tendency to
diverge. Reinsdorf showed that from 1980 to
1990, these series for comparable products di-
verge by roughly 2 percentage points a year,
with the CPI series rising faster than the AP
series. And the same divergence continued
through 1995 (Nakamura, 1998).
The advantage of the CPI method is sup-
posed to be that the items for which it collects
prices and the outlets where they are sold are
held fixed. But if consumers change where they
shop or what they buy, the CPI can give a mis-
leading impression of what is happening to the
prices they pay. If quality is rising (as the ap-
parent improvement in freshness, availability,
and variety of fresh fruits and vegetables would
suggest), average prices should be rising more
rapidly than the CPI. After all, if quality is ris-
ing and consumers are, on average, shifting
toward better goods that are costlier to produce,
this should cause the average price across all
goods to rise faster than the price of a typical
good of fixed quality. Instead, the opposite is
happening: the CPI reports that prices of fixed-
quality goods are rising faster, a contradiction
that suggests that the CPI is gravely overstat-
ing inflation.
In Reinsdorf’s studies, 16 of the 52 food items
covered by the average price series are fresh
fruits and vegetables. The evidence indicates
that much of the discrepancy, at least for fresh
fruits and vegetables, is caused by problems
associated with price variability and price dis-
persion. Fresh fruits and vegetables are seasonal
products, and their prices rise and fall dramati-
cally from month to month, if the item is avail-
able at all. Moreover, their perishability can
cause prices to vary dramatically across stores.
The formulas that the BLS introduced in 1978
were apparently very vulnerable to these fluc-
tuations and provided upwardly biased mea-
sures because of them. But the problems are not
confined to fresh fruits and vegetables.
James MacDonald, an economist with the
Department of Agriculture, showed similar dis-
crepancies for nonperishable food products in
a 1995 study that compared CPI data with su-
permarket checkout (scanner) data for 1989-94.
MacDonald used A.C. Nielsen Company data
that report the quantity sold nationwide in a
given month for a particular item, as well as
the total dollar sales for the item. The advan-
tage of Nielsen data is that they report the quan-
tities sold at different prices, while the BLS’s
price inspectors report only the particular price
they observe, not the amount sold at that price.
MacDonald did two analyses. The first used
data from 1988-91 for those items for which the
BLS product categories and the A.C. Nielsen
product categories closely corresponded. For
each of these 14 groups, the CPI inflation mea-
sures were consistently higher; the average gap
9The CPI for food discussed here is the index for “food-
at-home,” which excludes “food-away-from-home,” that
is, restaurants.
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was 1.4 percentage points a year. The second
comparison used a wider array of classes of
nonperishable products, comparing annual
price changes for the leading brand in each of
323 product classes between April 1988 and
April 1993 with the BLS price indexes for these
product classes. The CPI for these products
grew at an annual rate of 3.7 percent per year,
compared with 1.9 percent for the Nielsen
items—the CPI showed an upward bias of 1.8
percentage points a year. This finding shows
that the bias is not confined to seasonal prod-
ucts.
In another study, Reinsdorf (1994) noted that
the CPI for food could be compared to the BLS’s
Producer Price Index (PPI) for the same cat-
egory (called consumer foods).10  In this com-
parison, it again appears that although before
1978 the CPI and the PPI for food showed no
systematic tendency to diverge, after 1978 the
CPI for food has grown nearly 1.5 percentage
points a year faster.
OUTPUT MEASUREMENT
An important use of price data is to permit
us to compare real expenditures over time: real
expenditures are said to rise if the dollars spent
rise faster than the prices of the items pur-
chased. If the CPI is upwardly biased in mea-
suring food inflation, using it to deflate nomi-
nal expenditures on food will produce under-
estimates of growth in real expenditures. One
test of the accuracy of the CPI is to compare
nominal measures deflated using the CPI with
direct measures of quantity. If CPI-deflated
output grows more slowly than a pure measure
of quantity, we have strong evidence that the
CPI is biased.11
The U.S. Department of Agriculture com-
putes implicit quantities of U.S. food consump-
tion by weight by adding up U.S. production,
imports from abroad, and carryover inventory
from the previous year, and subtracting exports,
processing and nonfood uses, and final end-of-
year inventory. These measures are called dis-
appearance estimates. Over the period 1978 to
1988, disappearance data imply that per capita
consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables
measured in pounds rose 25 percent, or 2.3 per-
cent a year (MacDonald). But deflating U.S.
domestic expenditures on fresh fruits and veg-
etables by the CPI measures for these catego-
ries implies that consumption of fresh veg-
etables declined 1.2 percent a year and consump-
tion of fresh fruits declined 0.2 percent a year.
Thus, when compared with measures based on
disappearance data, the CPI-based measures
underestimate growth in consumption of fresh
fruits and vegetables by over 2 percent a year.
This discrepancy is a strong argument that the
CPI overstated food-price inflation during this
period.
Another way to measure output is to ask,
what is the contribution of different actors along
the distribution chain? Consumption is, after
all, the result of the net contributions of farms,
factories, wholesalers, truck drivers, and retail-
ers in adding value to the product until the con-
sumer can purchase it. To measure the net
value-added of food retailers, we can measure
the real output of farms, factories, and whole-
salers in producing goods that food retailers
buy and subtract that contribution from the real
sales of the food retailers. But our official sta-
tistics, again, give a distorted view.
Deflating food-store sales for 1992 by the CPI
for food gives a measure of the real value of
food products and retail services delivered to
10The Consumer Price Index measures prices paid by
urban consumers to retailers, while the Producer Price In-
dex measures prices received by producers (such as farm-
ers or manufacturers).
11This assumes that the quality of a unit of output was
constant or increased over the period, which seems rea-
sonable.Restructuring During Recessions: A Silver Lining in the Cloud? Keith Sill
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consumers. Similarly, using the PPI for con-
sumer foods to deflate food stores’1992 pur-
chases of  goods gives a measure of the real
value of products that farms and manufactur-
ers delivered to food stores. The difference be-
tween these two measures should be real retail
services added by the food stores: the economic
contribution of supermarkets as implied by our
official statistics (Table 3). What we see is that,
since 1977, the purchased input of supermar-
kets in real terms has risen 1.3 percent a year
faster than the supermarkets’ sales.12 In effect,
the statistics argue that supermarkets are de-
creasing their contribution to real output, us-
ing more inputs and somehow wasting much
of the increase. When we use this so-called
double-deflation methodology to estimate the
real contribution of supermarket output, we
find that food-store output has been declining
at an annual rate of 7.7 percent.13 This seems
unreasonable. As I have shown, the services
provided by food stores have been increasing
along a variety of dimensions. In other words,
our CPI statistics overstated inflation and un-
derstated output growth in this industry.14
The empirical studies we have been discuss-
ing provide further evidence that the CPI
mismeasured food-price inflation after 1978.
Moreover, Reinsdorf (1994) showed that the
average price and PPI data are consistent with
the CPI data until 1978. Did the revision to the
BLS’s methodology for the CPI in 1978 — done
to correct upward biases — actually exacerbate
them? We now turn to this crucial revision.
BLS PRICE MEASURES
The statisticians at the BLS are using a sta-
TABLE 3
The CPI Implies Unrealistic Declines in Services Provided
By Food Stores
PPI, CPI, Real Sales Real Double-Deflation
Consumer Food-at-Home of Food Stores Wholesale Output
Foods Purchases
of Goods for Resale
by Food Stores
1977-92 3.5 % 4.9 % 0.9 % 2.2 % -7.7 %
Source:  Economic Report of the President, 1997; BLS, Productivity Measures for Selected Industries and Government
Services, July 1996, Bulletin 2480; and author’s calculations.
12The CPI revision was phased in beginning at the end
of 1977.
13The “double-deflation” method deflates the revenues
of food stores by the CPI to obtain the total real output re-
ceived by consumers. It then uses the PPI to deflate the
total input received by the food stores from producers to
obtain a measure of the total real input of the producers.
The difference is the implied real value-added by the re-
tailer. Without going into all the details of the calculations,
when revenues are deflated at a faster rate than costs, as
here, the difference declines at a very fast rate.
14Another possibility is that the PPI for consumer foods
understates inflation. But the other evidence I have pre-
sented suggests the CPI is at fault. In either case,
mismeasurement is occurring — and has worsened since
the late 1970s.
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tistical framework constructed during an ear-
lier period, when prices were far less flexible
than they are now. Ironically, recommenda-
tions–made in 1960 and finally implemented in
1978—to improve the price statistics appear to
have backfired.
The Pre-1978 CPI Method and the Quality
Issue. Until 1978, BLS price inspectors around
the country priced products specified by BLS
headquarters in Washington. For example, all
inspectors would be asked to price “whole milk,
in glass bottles, quarts, delivered” or “bacon,
hand sliced, best quality.” These pricing catego-
ries were necessarily broad, as price inspectors
had to be able to find the product in each of the
dozens of urban markets they covered. Even
so, items within the categories were often hard
to find. Indeed, by 1978, home-delivered milk
and hand-sliced bacon had both long ceased to
be dominant retail items. As a result, price in-
spectors might have found themselves forced
to price a commodity that had become unim-
portant in total sales and whose price move-
ments had become idiosyncratic.
The breadth of the category definitions
meant that improvements in quality might oc-
cur without being picked up. One obvious ex-
ample is the pasteurization of milk in the early
part of the 20th century. Another is the improve-
ments in cars that took place in the 1950s. If a
new model Chevrolet came standard with a
more powerful engine and larger seating capac-
ity or, less obviously, a superior braking sys-
tem or smoother clutch, was the price increase
associated with the introduction entirely infla-
tion—or should some of it be counted as qual-
ity improvement?
A government-mandated review of the sta-
tistics in 1960 recommended that the quality
problem be partially solved by focusing on nar-
rower product definitions, developed locally by
price inspectors, and by systematically replac-
ing products to update the sample. This recom-
mendation was implemented in 1978.
The 1978 CPI Revision. Under the revisions,
price inspectors were empowered to determine
which products they would track. The price
inspectors were given broad product categories,
such as flour and prepared flour mixes, and a
store location based on a nationwide survey
called the Consumer Point of Purchase Survey.
For example, the inspector might be told to col-
lect prices at the Price Chain supermarket at the
corner of  Broad and Vine in Philadelphia. Then
the price inspector, with the help of store per-
sonnel, would choose several popular items
within the product category and, using scien-
tific sampling, pick one, say, Grandma
Nakamura’s chocolate fudge cake mix. Each
month for the next five years, the price inspec-
tor would record the price of that particular
item at that particular store (unless the store
stopped carrying that item or closed). This pro-
cedure improved the odds that the quality of
the good being priced was indeed unchanged.
This solution, which was widely discussed and
approved in the 1970s when it was introduced,
does not appear to have worked well in prac-
tice, partly because of price dispersion.
Prices have diverged into (a) the brand
name’s “list” or full price at the traditional su-
permarket; (b) the “sale” price of the brand
name; (c) the price of the generic equivalent or
alternative “discount” brands; and (d) the price
at the discount superstore. The highest of these
prices is the first, and the gaps have widened
over time, but the narrow product definitions
focus on the first price. To the extent that sales
have shifted away from the brand name at full
price at the traditional supermarket, the CPI
inflation rate is going to be biased upward rela-
tive to the average price consumers pay.
Every five years, the Consumer Point of Pur-
chase Survey data are used to refresh the sample
and new product-store combinations are sub-
stituted. This substitution assumes that the old
good at the old location and the new one at the
new location offer the same quality per dollar,
so that any difference in price between them
does not represent inflation. In fact, the newRestructuring During Recessions: A Silver Lining in the Cloud? Keith Sill
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15Moulton (1996) argues that the bias resulting from
shifts to “warehouse” stores is small, since, as pointed out
above, the share of purchases at such stores has increased
only 10 percentage points. But the shift to superstores has
also resulted in bias, and purchases at these stores have
increased 35 percentage points.
product-store combination may have replaced
the old precisely because it offered superior
value, but this added value is ignored. If the
old good was a particular brand and size of
toothpaste sold at $3, and the new good was
precisely the same brand and size but sold at
$2 at the new, more efficient outlet that replaced
the old outlet, none of the decline in price is
recorded. The CPI treats the decline in price as
a decline in quality–the lower price is taken to
mean that the inconvenience of buying the
toothpaste at the new store costs the consumer
$1 per purchase.15
The Bureau of Labor Statistics Continues
to Revise Its Methodology. The  BLS has iden-
tified and acted on one problem caused by price
dispersion, so-called formula bias. Suppose,
when the sample is refreshed, the new product
chosen is Diet Pop at each of two similar su-
permarkets. At one store, Diet Pop is on sale at
a discount when the survey is taken: $2 a 12-
pack.  At the other, Diet Pop is offered at the
regular price: $4 a 12-pack. At each store, let us
say, the priced item represents a beverage cat-
egory that has $200,000 in annual sales. The
store with the discounted price apparently sells
100,000 12-packs, while the store with the non-
discounted price apparently sells only 50,000
12-packs; the result is that Diet Pop at the store
that is temporarily discounting it is given a
greater weight in calculating the Consumer
Price Index. This procedure would be sensible
if these were permanent price differences be-
tween the two stores, reflecting higher costs at
one location.
 But suppose there is no real difference be-
tween the two stores. Next month, Diet Pop at
the first store reverts to the regular price while
the second store discounts it. In calculating the
inflation rate of Diet Pop, the store that had the
lower price when the weights were determined
is given more weight. So instead of the two
changes canceling out, the net effect is an in-
crease in inflation. This is formula bias, and it
results from the fact that price differences need
not reflect cost differences and may reflect price
dispersion instead.
 In January 1995, the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics revised its methods for introducing prod-
ucts into the CPI for food with a technique
called seasoning. The idea behind seasoning is
to construct the quantity weights for a newly
introduced or substituted product using a price
that is months old. This sharply reduces the
chance that a good with an unusually low cur-
rent price is given too high a weight. This
change corrects much of the problem for fresh
fruits and vegetables and has reduced the up-
ward bias in the CPI for food by roughly one-
half of a percentage point, leaving about 1 to
1.5 percentage points of upward bias.
How do we know that food-price mismea-
surement continues? An important clue comes
from the use of the CPI to deflate U.S. personal
consumption expenditures for food.  Accord-
ing to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the real
consumption of food (including at restaurants)
remained almost unchanged between 1994,
when real food consumption was $688 billion,
to the third quarter of 1997, when it was $689
billion. It is extremely unlikely that, with popu-
lation growing and income and employment
rising, Americans were not increasing their to-
tal food consumption at all. This is strong evi-
dence that the CPI for food is still significantly
overestimating food-price inflation.
CONCLUSION
The new technology of retailing has de-
creased firms’ cost of changing their prices. As
a result, price dispersion has increasingly be-
come the norm for products—the price paid for
a product varies across stores, brands, days of
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the week, and customers. One consequence of
this change has been that measuring the price
paid for a product has become increasingly dif-
ficult.
Alternative data sources are available for
checking the validity of CPI price measures.  But
the chronically underfunded U.S. statistical
agencies are, by and large, limited to using a
single, imperfect methodology for price mea-
surement. This methodology led to dramatic
overstatement of food-price inflation during a
period in which inflation was public enemy
number one. Although steps have been taken
to improve the accuracy of the Consumer Price
Index, and more are in progress, the continu-
ing rapid changes in retailing technology—in-
cluding the Internet—suggest that U.S. statis-
tics will continue to lag behind the marketplace.
REFERENCES
Betancourt, Roger R., and Margaret Malanoski. “Prices, Distribution Services, and Supermarket Com-
petition,” University of Maryland Working Paper 95-08, June 1995.
Bliss, Christopher. “A Theory of Retail Pricing,” Journal of Industrial Economics 36, June 1988, pp. 375-
92.
Levy, Daniel, Mark Bergen, Shantanu Dutta, and Robert Venable. “The Magnitude of Menu Costs:
Direct Evidence from Large U.S. Supermarket Chains,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, August
1997, pp. 791-826.
MacDonald, James M. “Consumer Price Index Overstates Food-Price Inflation,” Food Review, Sep-
tember-December 1995, pp. 28-32.
Moulton, Brent R. “Bias in the Consumer Price Index: What Is the Evidence?” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Fall 1996, pp. 159-177.
Nakamura, Leonard I. “The Measurement of Retail Output and the Retail Revolution,” Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 98-5, March 1998 (also forthcoming in the Canadian
Journal of Economics).
Nakamura, Leonard I.“Is the U.S. Economy Really Growing Too Slowly?  Maybe We’re Measuring
Growth Wrong,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, March/April 1997, pp. 3-
14.
Nakamura, Leonard I.“Measuring Inflation in a High-Tech Age,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia Business Review, November/December 1995, pp. 13-25.
Reinsdorf, Marshall. “The Effect of Outlet Price Differentials on the U.S. Consumer Price Index,” in
Foss, Murray F., et al., eds., Price Measurements and Their Uses. University of Chicago, Chicago,
1993.
Reinsdorf, Marshall. “Price Dispersion, Seller Substitution, and the U.S. CPI,” Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics Working Paper 252, March 1994.